Myanmar’s ‘Election’ Unfolds as Expected, Offering Largely Cosmetic Change
BGA Senior Adviser Amb. Scot Marciel wrote an update to clients on Myanmar’s elections.
Context
- Myanmar’s deeply flawed election produced the expected results: an overwhelming victory by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) that promises little more than cosmetic change and scant prospects for peace or significant improvement in the economy. Even calling the polls “elections” is a stretch, given the junta’s continued imprisonment of pro-democracy leaders, its prohibition of genuine opposition parties and control of the media and low voter turnout. In addition, there are serious questions about the huge percentage of pro-junta votes from non-transparent “advance” voting.
- The USDP won an overwhelming majority of elected seats, which combined with the military’s guaranteed 166 seats, gives the military and its allies a large majority in the new Parliament, which is expected to convene in March to “elect” a president, who will then form a government in April. The opposition National Union Government (NUG) and other resistance forces have denounced the elections, suggesting that the ongoing conflict is likely to continue.
- China has welcomed the elections and made clear it will step up engagement with the new government. If junta chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing becomes president, that would suggest little prospect of the sort of policy change, including in the economy, that China and many others have been seeking. Investors will know more in April, when the new president will have been selected and a new cabinet is formed.
Significance
- The new Parliament is expected to meet in March, when it will choose the next president. That president, in turn, will form a new government in April. This will officially be the end of the military junta and the beginning of a so-called “civilian government.”
- Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who led the coup and has largely dominated the junta since then, is the most likely person to be chosen as president. There are reports that there is some infighting between the military and the USDP over apportionment of cabinet seats, and it is possible that there will be an effort to choose someone other than Min Aung Hlaing as president.
- China, which has backed the junta and pressed for the elections, reportedly has hoped that the elections would result in Min Aung Hlaing exiting the political stage. Beijing has substantial influence, and it is possible — though unlikely — that it will impose enough pressure on the military and new parliamentarians to engineer a sidelining of the senior general. Min Aung Hlaing, however, has continued to reshuffle the military leadership, putting loyalists in key positions, presumably in anticipation of giving up his military commander-in-chief role for the civilian presidency.
- China, India, Russia and others can be expected to use the elections as an opportunity to step up engagement. China, in fact, has already stated its intent to do exactly that. While ASEAN has been clear that it does not view the elections as credible, the January visit of Philippine Foreign Secretary Teresa Lazaro to Naypyitaw as the ASEAN special envoy suggests that even some election skeptics among the ASEAN members might be willing to engage with the new government, due to their perception that there are no other good options and their fear of excessive Chinese influence in the country.
- The NUG and other resistance forces have given no indication that they intend to change course in response to the elections. They can be expected to continue fighting and to press the international community not to recognize the new government. Nevertheless, the resistance’s inability to sustain the momentum it had developed in late 2023 and early 2024, combined with the populace’s fatigue and potential greater international recognition of the new government, presents the possibility that the resistance as a whole could weaken. Individual armed groups — particularly powerful ethnic armies like the Arakan Army, Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Organization — will likely continue to fight, unless the new government makes them offers that are too good to refuse.
Implications
- The formation of a new government is unlikely to herald a significant change in economic policy and direction. This is particularly true if Min Aung Hlaing becomes president, as he has shown no inclination to shift away from the military’s intrusive and incompetent role in shaping policy, including steps to restrict imports and maintain non-market exchange rates. Some have expressed hope that the new government will adopt significant reforms, along the lines of those adopted by President Thein Sein beginning in 2011-2012. That possibility cannot be ruled out, but at this point, it is a hope that is not based on concrete evidence.
- Other scenarios become more possible if someone besides Min Aung Hlaing becomes president or if other developments suggest he will have less influence than he has enjoyed to date. Even then, however, the new government will struggle to address more deeply rooted problems, ranging from a severe energy shortage to a serious brain drain and the widespread conflict with resistance forces. Investors might want to withhold final judgment until April, when the selection of the new president and formation of a new cabinet will offer some sense of prospects for substantial change in economic policy and direction.
We will continue to keep you updated on developments in Myanmar as they occur. If you have any questions or comments, please contact BGA Senior Adviser Amb. Scot Marciel at smarciel@bowergroupasia.com.
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