US-Israel War in Iran: Implications for Energy Markets in the Indo-Pacific

Across the Indo-Pacific, governments are reeling from the disruption of the hydrocarbon supply chain due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz because of the Iran conflict. BGA’s teams across the Indo-Pacific note that most governments are less concerned about physical supply shortages and more focused on price premiums driven by heightened geopolitical risks. Even without direct disruptions, elevated freight, insurance and risk‑adjusted pricing are pushing up fuel import costs and adding inflationary pressure across the region.

India, however, is more concerned about supply disruption compared to other markets due to its high level of dependence on liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar. India’s largest LNG importer, Petronet, has issued a force majeure clause following Qatar Energy’s halted LNG production and declaration of force majeure on LNG exports. China also faces concern over supply shortages in the medium term as the largest importer of Iran’s crude, despite having large-scale strategic petroleum reserves.

With the tightening supplies, BGA observes governments across Asia racing to diversify their energy sources. Most Asian countries look to the United States as an alternative hydrocarbon supplier. While the shift enables some countries to secure hydrocarbon supplies, governments cannot avoid the inflationary pressures that come with the shift. Bloomberg reported that shipping costs from the United States to Asia have jumped from around 4-7 percent of the West Texas Intermediate crude price to almost 20 percent as demand spikes.

BGA projects that countries with large hydrocarbon subsidies, notably Indonesia and Thailand, are expected to face growing fiscal strain as rising oil and gas prices widen subsidy requirements and squeeze national budgets.

As countries brace for energy price increases, some governments in Asia have prepared policies to cushion the price increase to the public. Vietnam mulls tapping its Petroleum Stabilization Fund to absorb the premium, Taiwan is extending tax relief on key materials, and the Philippines is looking to apply staggered fuel price adjustments to avoid price shock. Korea’s long-term contract on crude oil procurement also protects the country from price hike in the short-to-medium term.

A key policy to watch for is the increasing number of countries that are applying or considering hydrocarbon export restrictions to protect domestic sources. Thailand recently announced it will halt exports of crude oil, while China haspaused exports of diesel and gasoline. Such policies threaten to further fracture Asia’s hydrocarbon supply chain.

Companies are advised to pay close attention to Asia’s refining centers such as Singapore, which becomes a refined petroleum supplier for other markets such as Indonesia and Vietnam. Disruption of Singapore’s refinery sector could flame energy insecurity of importing countries.

Below is BGA’s market analysis and insights from our teams across the region on the impact of the Iran conflict on energy security in countries across the Indo-Pacific, with a focus on energy importing markets.

For further questions or comments, please contact BGA Director of Energy, Climate and Resources (ECR) Chayamon Srisongkram, BGA Director of ECR Mardika Parama or BGA Head of Research Murray Hiebert.

China

Impact Assessment

China finds itself at the forefront of the Iran conflict as the largest single importer of Iranian crude, taking nearly 90 percent of Iran’s exports, though this is not reflected in official customs data. Despite this exposure, China is also well-prepared in the short term, thanks to its extensive strategic and commercial oil stockpiles (estimated at 1.2-1.5 billion barrels), which can cover imports for about 90-120 days. Still, the immediate disruption of around 1.4 million barrels a day from Iran (roughly 13-14 percent of China’s seaborne crude) mainly affects regional independent refineries concentrated in Shandong province. These privately owned, non-state-operated facilities depend heavily on discounted Iranian oil and are less able to offset losses with more expensive alternatives.

The greater threat lies not just in losing Iranian supply but in potential instability around the Strait of Hormuz. This critical shipping lane, carrying an estimated 45-65 percent of China’s seaborne crude — including shipments from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — could see disruptions that pressure global energy markets even before real shortages occur through rising insurance costs and rerouted tankers. The situation escalated when Qatar stopped LNG production after attacks on its gas facilities, jeopardizing about 30 percent of China’s LNG imports and straining power generation and industry due to limited spot market access compared to countries like Japan and Korea.

Domestically, China’s low inflation environment offers some cushion: consumer prices rose only 0.2 percent and producer prices have been falling for 40 straight months. Unlike several Asian peers, China does not use direct fuel subsidies; instead, state entities absorb price increases, insulating consumers but straining their own finances. Nevertheless, if oil prices persist above $90-$100 per barrel, costs will eventually rise for transportation, petrochemicals and industrial inputs, posing risks for China’s already fragile economic recovery.

On the international stage, recent U.S.-led military actions against both Iran and Venezuela disrupt two key Chinese energy partners. Beijing interprets these moves as attempts to undermine its access to affordable, sanctioned oil, accelerating efforts to secure alternative supplies from other Gulf states. At home, government signals urge state enterprises to preserve reserves and elevate green energy development as an issue of national security.

In summary, while China can weather short-term shocks through existing reserves and shifting supply, continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would present serious mid-term challenges, especially for independent refineries and LNG-dependent sectors. More broadly, these events highlight the need for rapid reforms in China’s energy security strategy, given its reliance on vulnerable supply routes and sanctioned states.

Current Government Action

• Diplomatic intervention in Hormuz: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has publicly called for an immediate halt to military operations and diplomatically pressed Iranian counterparts not to target oil tankers or Qatar’s LNG export infrastructure transiting the strait. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held calls with counterparts in Russia, Iran, Oman, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On March 5, MFA Spokesperson Mao Ning confirmed China will send Special Envoy Zhai Jun to the Middle East specifically to work toward de-escalation — signaling Beijing’s intent to position itself as a peace broker while protecting its energy interests.
• Domestic supply protection measures: Bloomberg reported March 5 that Beijing instructed its largest oil refiner (Sinopec) to halt diesel and gasoline exports. MFA Spokesperson Mao Ning said the same day that she was “not aware” of such instructions. No official government directive has been published to date. The January 2025 Energy Law already mandates private companies to build strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) under state oversight, accelerating the SPR build already underway since early 2025.

India

Impact Assessment

India faces low near‑term risk of an outright energy shortage but a moderate risk of supply tightness, particularly for LNG. Approximately 55 percent of India’s crude oil and LNG passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Crude supply is relatively buffered in the short term: India holds 25 days of crude oil, 25 days of petroleum products and up to 30 days of LPG, alongside strategic reserves of 5.3 million metric tons (about 9-10 days of crude demand). However, gas availability is likely to be more vulnerable as India lacks gas reserves.

The risk of higher energy prices is moderate to high beyond the buffer period. With crude import dependence at 90 percent in fiscal year 2025, industry experts cite that each $1 rise in crude adds around $2 billion to the import bill. Prior disruptions show that rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope can extend voyages by up to 35 days, tightening tanker availability and pushing up freight rates. For LNG, supply shocks tend to translate rapidly into spot price spikes, amplifying impact on price-sensitive sectors such as refineries, power, fertilizer and industry, which may switch to alternate fuels.

For the government, the most significant risks are macro‑fiscal and inflationary rather than physical shortages. Higher energy prices raise the energy import bill, widen the current account deficit and put pressure on the rupee, increasing the likelihood of fiscal intervention through LPG subsidies or fuel‑tax adjustments to protect consumers and potentially widening the fiscal deficit. These pressures heighten inflation risks, particularly through fuel, transport, fertilizers and power.

Policy responses are therefore likely to focus on volatility management, including close coordination with oil marketing companies (OMCs) on inventories and calibrated use of strategic petroleum reserves, faster diversification of crude and LNG sourcing toward non‑Hormuz routes, temporary tax and subsidy adjustments if price spikes persist and a renewed emphasis on demand substitution (biofuels, renewables, efficiency) to reduce exposure over time.

Current Government Action

• The government indicated it is comfortable with its energy inventories and has put in place continuous monitoring of supply chains amid the West Asia escalation.
• OMCs and refiners have been advised to diversify crude and LNG sourcing, including supplies not routed through the Strait of Hormuz, and prepare to reroute shipping if disruptions persist.
• The government has signaled its readiness to take phased fiscal or inventory measures to protect consumers from price shocks.

Indonesia

Impact Assessment

Indonesia is expected to face some impact on its crude oil supply due to sourcing from Saudi Arabia, which accounts for 20 percent of domestic crude supply and which the government deems manageable for a supply shift. Indonesia also would likely not be impacted by a potential cutoff of LNG supplies, and this would only have a limited impact on LNG price.

However, Indonesia is highly exposed to increased energy prices due to its dependence on crude and fuel imports and its limited reserve capacity. The Indonesian government does not have the ability to conduct price interventions by releasing strategic reserve supplies.

Indonesia also heavily subsidizes fuel and LPG. It has allocated around IDR 105 trillion ($6.2 billion) for fuel and LPG subsidies in 2026, with the 2026 state budget assuming crude prices in the $70-$82 range based on the government determined Indonesia crude price.

Sustained price increases beyond the range would trigger fiscal reassessment and further squeeze the already tight government budget.

The Indonesian government will need to make a hard decision to find more budget to sustain ballooning subsidies or further increase already high inflation. Based on existing regulations, the government could declare an “energy crisis,” which allows it to restrict crude oil export from domestic production and increase energy imports.

Current Government Action

• The president summoned the minister for energy and mines March 2 to develop plans to mitigate energy shortages.
• The minister for energy announced March 3 that Indonesia will shift all crude oil sourcing from Saudi Arabia, which accounts for 20 percent of all crude imports, to the United States. The government will also assess the impact on the state budget, although no details have been released.
• BGA assesses that the shift to the U.S. market sources is also based on the Agreement on Reciprocal Tariffs, which include Indonesia’s pledge to procure $15 billion worth of energy commodities.

Japan

Impact Assessment

Japan faces a low-to-immediate risk of outright physical shortages in oil, but it remains one of Asia’s most exposed economies to a prolonged Gulf disruption because of its unusually heavy dependence on Middle Eastern crude. Around 95 percent of Japan’s oil imports come from the Middle East, and roughly 70 percent typically transits the Strait of Hormuz. In the near term, this risk is cushioned by exceptionally large oil stockpiles equivalent to 254 days of consumption/net imports, giving Tokyo much more room to manage a supply shock than most Asian peers. Japan’s LNG position is more manageable than its crude position, but LNG supplies are still vulnerable if the crisis drags on. Utilities have already increased LNG stockpiles, with major power companies holding 2.2 million tons and total national inventories estimated at more than 4 million tons.

The more serious risk for Japan is therefore price and logistics disruption rather than immediate shortage. Shipping interruptions in the Gulf have already left Japanese vessels waiting in the region, while insurers, freight markets and tanker availability are tightening. For Japan, this means higher landed costs for crude, LNG and refined products even before any formal supply rationing occurs. Because Japan remains heavily import-dependent and the yen has been weak, a prolonged energy shock would feed directly into import prices, transport costs and power bills.

The most significant risk for the Japanese government is a return to a low-growth, high-cost environment. Unlike some Southeast Asian markets, Tokyo is not primarily worried about immediate fuel availability, it is more concerned about the macroeconomic impact of higher import prices, weaker household purchasing power and renewed pressure on inflation expectations.

Policy responses will likely focus on market stabilization, selective fiscal cushioning and supplier diplomacy rather than emergency demand controls for now. If the conflict persists, likely next options would include a coordinated reserve release with partners, an extension or recalibration of fuel subsidies and additional fiscal support to cushion households and businesses from imported energy inflation.

Current Government Action

• The government is relying on existing LNG inventories, intra-utility transfers and spot purchases, while confirming that there are currently no specific plans to release oil stockpiles. It was reported that 42 Japan-related ships were waiting in the Gulf as of March 3.
• Major Japanese utilities have increased LNG stockpiles by 10 percent, with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment reporting 2.2 million tons held by major power companies as of March 1.
• Japan has long maintained a policy of safely restarting nuclear power plants to ensure adequate electricity supply, a strategy that has gained greater importance amid rising tensions in the Middle East. Progress on key nuclear restarts continues. Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), reached 100 percent output (1.4 million kilowatts) March 3. TEPCO confirmed stable operations and aims to transition the unit to commercial operation March 18, marking the first such operation in about 14 years. Preparations are also advancing to restart Unit 7, which has the same generating capacity. Once Units 6 and 7 are operational, they are expected to offset roughly 4 million tons of LNG consumption annually, equivalent to about 6 percent of Japan’s total LNG imports, strengthening Japan’s energy security and helping stabilize energy costs.

Korea

Impact Assessment

Iran’s Hormuz blockage poses a threat to Korea because the route accounts for 65 percent of oil and 20 percent of LNG imports and nearly all petroleum energy, a critical input for this heavily manufacturing-oriented economy, originates from overseas. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) issued an “interest” level resource security crisis alert March 5 — the first in a four-phase alert system — for crude oil and gas. The ministry explained that this alert aimed to proactively prepare contingency plans under the crisis management manual while minimizing the impact on citizens and businesses, keeping in mind the possibility of sudden changes in the Middle East.

At the same time, MOTIR emphasized that despite the recent rise in international crude oil futures prices, Korea’s high proportion of long-term contracts means there is no immediate impact on the market. The government expects the impact on the economy to be limited if the situation is resolved quickly, as it can respond using domestic oil reserves. According to data from the Korea National Oil Corporation at the end of November, Korea’s combined government and private oil reserves amounted to 221 days, well above the International Energy Agency standard of 90 days.

Korea’s consumer price index remained stable at 2 percent for the second consecutive month in February, led by a 2.4 percent decline in petroleum prices, which have yet to fully reflect the Iran crisis. Nevertheless, experts point out that if the war prolongs and crude oil prices exceed $100 per barrel, a rise in inflation and a slowdown in growth would be unavoidable, prompting comprehensive measures, including a supplementary budget. Initially, strong semiconductor exports in January and February made it unlikely that the conditions for a supplementary budget would be met. However, the government may reassess the situation if oil prices rise.

For now, while ruling out immediate impact to the economy and energy prices, the government is reviewing various alternatives to prepare for a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, including the possibility of increasing imports of U.S. crude oil.

Current Government Action

• President Lee Jae Myung said March 5 that the government is preparing measures to stabilize financial markets and safeguard energy supply, given Korea’s reliance on imported fuel and internationally exposed financial markets.
• Lee instructed ministries to respond swiftly to potential instability in stock and foreign exchange markets and ensure that the government’s $68 billion (KRW 100 trillion) market stabilization program can be deployed if needed. Authorities were also directed to prepare emergency supply stabilization measures for crude oil, gas and naphtha, while accelerating efforts to diversify import sources.
• Lee ordered officials to review possible sanctions against “fuel price gouging” and to set the maximum price of petroleum products by region and type. This comes following reports that gasoline prices at some stations have risen significantly despite no confirmed disruption to domestic fuel supply.

Philippines

Impact Assessment

The Department of Energy (DOE) has affirmed that the Philippines currently has a sufficient reserve capacity and does not risk an energy shortage, because national fuel inventories remain well above mandated levels. The DOE shared that oil companies are required to maintain at least 15 days’ worth of supply, yet current stocks are estimated at 45-60 days‚ or more than three times the minimum inventory requirement, ensuring stability for around two months. This is further strengthened by additional shipments incoming to the Philippines. Despite escalating tensions in the Middle East, the department has ensured that the domestic market has sufficient reserves to avoid disruptions.

However, while supply is stable, the DOE made clear that the market does face significant risks of higher fuel prices. Global crude prices have climbed to approximately $79-$80 per barrel, leading to upward pressure on domestic pump prices. As for the latest DOE monitoring, gasoline stands at PHP 54.50 ($0.92), diesel at PHP 60.79 ($1.02) and kerosene at PHP 84.67 ($1.42), with further increases expected as logistics, insurance and shipping costs rise due to the geopolitical situation. While projections have yet to be released, the DOE confirms higher prices are already anticipated in the following week.

The most significant risks for the government are centered on the broader economic impact of sustained oil price increases. Higher fuel costs typically cascade into increases in transportation fares and logistics fees. Even though only about 3 percent of the Philippines’ power generation relies on oil, indirect pressures may still emerge from increased shipping costs for coal and LNG cargoes, potentially straining inflation management and household spending power. These cross-sector pressures require careful coordination across agencies to mitigate second round effects on the economy.

Current Government Action

The DOE is pursuing policy interventions to cushion consumers and maintain market order.

• Foremost among these is the staggered implementation of price increases, intended to avoid one-time, large adjustments that could immediately burden motorists and businesses.
• The DOE is also in active discussions with oil companies about expanded discount programs and is coordinating with the Department of Transportation on possible assistance for the public transportation sector, for which fuel is a major operational cost.
• Finally, the DOE is exploring possible policy adjustments, including discussions with Congress and economic managers on the recalibration or potential suspension of excise taxes should price spikes worsen. Alongside these policy tools, the DOE continues to promote its energy efficiency campaign, urging the public to adopt fuel saving practices.

Singapore

Impact Assessment

Singapore is unlikely to face an immediate disruption to its energy supply arising from the conflict in Iran, given the breadth of its sourcing strategy. Around 95 percent of Singapore’s electricity comes from natural gas, with supplies imported through pipelines from neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. It is also delivered by ship from more distant sources. LNG imports have increased in recent years following the expansion of Singapore’s LNG terminal, helping diversify supply sources. No single country accounted for more than 30 percent of Singapore’s total gas supply, strengthening Singapore’s energy security and reducing its exposure to potential air and maritime disruptions stemming from regional instability.

The more significant risk to Singapore lies in rising energy prices and its impact on the economy. As an open, trade-dependent economy and energy importer, Singapore remains exposed to global price volatility. Without direct subsidies for fuel or electricity, fluctuations in global oil and gas markets are transmitted to businesses and consumers. Reflecting this, pump prices in Singapore rose March 4, and the Energy Market Authority cautioned that households may face higher electricity bills if fuel costs remain elevated. Prolonged oil price volatility may also have broader spillover effects, increasing transportation and production costs, particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as aviation and manufacturing — a key driver of GDP. This could compress profit margins for companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises.

Adding to the economic risk, Singapore is a major oil trading and refining hub, with its refineries processing significant volumes of crude oil. Much of this output is reexported, with refined petroleum products accounting for around 19 percent — SGD 55.9 billion (US$43.7 billion) — of total merchandise exports in 2024. Hence, higher oil prices will likely lead to disruptions to crude oil imports, materially impacting Singapore’s export performance and overall economic growth.

With both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea under pressure, freight rates on major global trade lanes are expected to remain elevated through the first half of 2026. As the world’s busiest transshipment port, Singapore is likely to see a direct hit to its port volumes and bunkering revenue, impacting its status as a logistics hub.

Current Government Action

The government is closely monitoring developments, indicating that it will reassess GDP growth forecasts if necessary. At present, the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate remains within the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s (MAS) appreciating policy band, which should dampen imported inflation. Should inflationary pressures intensify, MAS has reiterated that it is well-positioned to take action to mitigate any risks to macroeconomic stability. BGA will continue to assess the broader impact on Singapore’s economy and monitor any changes in energy policies.

Taiwan

Impact Assessment

With strategic reserves and diversified procurement, geopolitical instability in the Middle East poses a manageable short-term risk to Taiwan’s energy security. The government continues to ensure continuity of supply.

Energy prices face upward pressure but are cushioned by state-led stabilization measures. Political incentives ahead of the 2026 midterms, combined with Taipower’s return to profitability, provide fiscal space to avoid immediate tariff hikes.

However, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could challenge emergency protocols and supply stability. Taiwan’s key AI and semiconductor sectors require reliable, high-volume power, and limited reserve margins could heighten cross-strait security risks during periods of tension.

In response, Taiwan is accelerating its shift toward greater energy resilience and diversification. The crisis may hasten moves to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern crude and LNG via imports from the United States and Australia while boosting support for alternative fuels such as E10.

Current Government Action

• The Executive Yuan’s Price Stabilization Task Force meets weekly, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Energy Response Task Force meets daily to ensure supply continuity. Its three-stage protocol prioritizes non-Middle Eastern procurement (e.g., United States, Australia), coordinates regional assistance (Japan, Korea) and uses spot market purchases to fill gaps.
• To keep annual consumer price index growth under 2 percent, tax relief on key raw materials has been extended through September, alongside fuel price-smoothing measures.
• BGA Taiwan is closely monitoring a potential prolonged Strait of Hormuz blockade and any escalatory Chinese military actions that could increase regional risks.

Thailand

Impact Assessment

Thailand faces limited immediate risk of energy shortages due to strong domestic refining capacity and petroleum reserves. The country holds roughly 60 days of petroleum reserves, while refining capacity exceeds domestic fuel consumption. Thailand also sources crude oil from multiple regions beyond the Middle East, including Southeast Asia, Africa and the United States. These factors reduce the likelihood of a near-term physical supply disruption, even if shipping routes in the Gulf face temporary constraints.

The primary risk for Thailand is price volatility. As a net importer of crude oil (over 90 percent) and LNG, the country remains exposed to global energy price swings driven by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. Any sustained disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz could raise freight costs and risk premiums in global oil markets, eventually increasing domestic fuel prices and electricity-generation costs.

The Thai government’s main concern is price stability and cost-of-living pressure rather than supply shortages. Fuel prices are politically sensitive due to their impact on transportation and household expenses. If global oil prices rise sharply, the government may rely more heavily on the Oil Fuel Fund or introduce additional price stabilization measures, potentially increasing fiscal pressure.

Authorities are also implementing short-term energy security measures to support domestic supply. These include increasing natural gas production in the Gulf of Thailand, postponing maintenance at gas fields to sustain output and ensuring coal and hydropower plants operate at full capacity to stabilize electricity supply.

Thailand’s refining sector provides an additional buffer. The country produces more refined fuel than it consumes domestically and exports the surplus to neighboring markets. However, authorities are reassessing export levels to ensure sufficient domestic supply if the regional crisis escalates.

Overall, Thailand’s energy system appears resilient in the near term. However, prolonged geopolitical disruption in the Middle East could still create economic pressure through higher fuel prices, increased fiscal intervention and rising electricity generation costs.

Current Government Action

• The Ministry of Energy has temporarily suspended most fuel exports to prioritize domestic supply, though exports to Laos continue under existing contractual arrangements due to regional energy interdependence.
• The government has established a 24-hour energy monitoring center to track global oil prices, shipping routes and national reserve levels in real time.
• Authorities have signaled readiness to deploy the Oil Fuel Fund to stabilize domestic fuel prices should global energy prices rise significantly.
• BGA will monitor potential further government intervention, including expanded price stabilization measures, adjustments to fuel export policies and shifts in crude sourcing toward alternative suppliers outside the Middle East.

Vietnam

Impact Assessment

Vietnam faces a potential energy shortage and a high exposure to energy price hikes if the Middle East conflict is prolonged because it sources a significant portion of its oil and gas demand from countries in the region and the country’s current reserves are limited.

Currently, domestic supply covers only 70 percent of Vietnam’s gasoline and diesel petroleum needs, with the remaining 30 percent entirely dependent on imports. Current supplies from Vietnam’s two refineries and major petroleum traders are projected to last until the end of March and the refineries are actively working to ensure the supply after March.

Nghi Son refinery, which supplies 40 percent of the petroleum for the domestic market, uses primarily Kuwait crude oil, while Dung Quat refinery sources 80 percent of its demand from domestic crude oil and the rest from regional suppliers. The disruption of crude oil supply to these refineries will impact the entire country’s economy.

A similar situation exists with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and LNG. PVGas has reported that its LNG reserves are sufficient for electricity generation until the end of April after recently importing two shipments totaling about 14,000 tons, which brings the current reserves to around 15,000 tons. However, possible LPG disruptions may arise because 70 percent of Vietnam’s LNG imports come from the Middle East. In response, PVGas is diversifying import sources, prioritizing local demand over exports and boosting output at its two gas plants to increase domestic supply by 5 percent, aiming to ensure enough LPG for March and beyond.

A sustained conflict in the Middle East may lead to higher energy prices, rising manufacturing costs and electricity rates, which would affect livelihoods and threaten Vietnam’s energy security. Rising inflation, impacted production and trade interruptions could also challenge the nation’s ambitious double-digit growth goals.

Current Government Action

• The prime minister of Vietnam established a government working group on energy security March 4. This group, led by a deputy prime minister and comprising the acting minister of industry and trade, vice ministers from construction, foreign affairs, environment and agriculture as well as chairmen of Vietnam’s key energy corporations, will develop measures and plans to maintain energy security and coordinate actions among relevant government agencies to minimize any impact from the crisis on Vietnam.
• The government is developing several contingency plans. One option under consideration is using the Petroleum Price Stabilization Fund to support petroleum product prices, depending on market volatility conditions. Additionally, the government is reviewing Binh Son Refining and Petrochemical Joint Stock Company’s proposal to temporarily prioritize domestic crude oil for the company and restrict domestic crude oil exports during periods of elevated risk.

Chayamon Srisongkram

Director

Amm is a service-driven professional who brings with her many years of consulting experience. Based in Bangkok, Amm first joined BGA as an analyst in BGA’s Thailand office before spending two years with the team in Washington D.C. In her current regional role, Amm provides policy support and helps clients foster engagements across BGA markets. Throughout her career, Amm has advised companies across multiple sectors, including fast-moving consumer goods, agriculture, energy and banking, and has supported firms in areas such as marketing, corporate governance and government relations. Prior to joining BGA, she was an account manager at Kantar, a consumer ... Read More