BGA Adviser Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran wrote an update to clients on the modest progress in U.S. defense ties with Southeast Asia.

Context

  • The kickoff of an expanded U.S.-Indonesia multinational exercise dubbed Super Garuda Shield on August 26 spotlights Washington’s efforts to make security inroads in Southeast Asia amid future policy uncertainty. This iteration of Super Garuda Shield, which features a first-of-its-kind cyber component, is just one of a series of notable defense developments between the United States and Southeast Asian countries as the Biden administration advances cooperation with regional states.
  • Attempted U.S. inroads, including with key countries and notable sectors, could have important implications for companies and other stakeholders. The upcoming U.S. presidential election in November also means uncertainty is likely to persist over other key components of Washington’s approach to Southeast Asia even as its defense inroads continue in the region and the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Significance

  • The expanded Super Garuda Shield marks a series of quiet U.S. inroads in building what the Pentagon refers to as networked security partnerships in Southeast Asia over the past few months. Gains with the Philippines have been most visible, including a new security sector assistance roadmap at a July “2+2” alliance meeting in Manila. But officials point to other notable regional gains that same month. These include the first iteration of a trilateral Australia-Malaysia-U.S. Keris Strike joint exercise and restarted trilateral maritime drills with Singapore and Thailand. This security networking is part of the “new convergence” in Indo-Pacific security U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin described at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June.
  • There are also ongoing efforts to boost sectoral cooperation in areas like cyber and maritime security. Some of Washington’s more ambitious sectoral ideas, including a long-floated U.S.-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) technology summit in the United States, have yet to be realized. But more bite-sized initiatives have made some notable progress. For instance, in June, the United States held a first-of-its-kind interagency maritime critical infrastructure cybersecurity exercise with Indonesia since both sides upgraded ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership last November. BGA understands Washington is also quietly providing advice to Southeast Asian states looking to stand up new cyber commands and coast guard-like functions. This is in line with boosting “collective capacity” as outlined in the 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Implications

  • Defense engagement with ASEAN has seen progress but is not without its issues. Collaboration on areas like maritime security have continued as both sides shape a new plan of action for the U.S.-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership framing ties from 2026 to 2030. U.S. officials are also building a new ASEAN emerging defense leaders program and pushing for a follow-up U.S.-ASEAN defense exercise after the first one back in 2019. But Washington also continues to engage minilaterally as well on some issues amid slow progress. For instance, at a time of China’s continued South China Sea assertiveness, U.S. officials have intensified minilateral law enforcement training for Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia and Thailand utilizing the Philippines as a hub in collaboration with Japan. Conversations on institutional architecture and minilateralism also factor into ASEAN’s own thinking as the group develops its Vision 2045 expected to be unveiled under Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship next year.
  • Looking ahead, interested companies should closely monitor upcoming interactions to assess the trajectory of some major U.S. defense ties in Southeast Asia. U.S. officials concede privately that much work remains to be done even on the basic architecture of the U.S.-Philippine alliance despite hype in some media accounts about progress to date. This includes following through on concluding foundational defense pacts like the General Security of Military Information Agreement by the end of 2024 and surging ahead on delayed implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Washington will also shape its presence at the second iteration of Vietnam’s international defense exhibition in December which kicked off in 2022. U.S. officials say there may be opportunities in areas like coproduction and defense technology research beyond any major military sales that may take place over time.

We will continue to keep you updated on developments as they occur. If you have any questions or comments, please contact BGA Adviser Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran at prashanth@bowergroupasia.com or BGA Senior Adviser Rupert Hammond-Chambers at Rupert Hammond-Chambers rupertjhc@bowergroupasia.com.

Best regards,

BowerGroupAsia

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Advisor

Prashanth is a recognized scholar, commentator and expert on geopolitical and geoeconomic developments across Asia. He has spent nearly two decades analyzing the region, with a focus on Asia’s politics and security, U.S. foreign policy and Southeast Asia.   Prashanth is concurrently a fellow at the Wilson Center, a senior columnist at The Diplomat magazine and an instructor for institutions including the U.S. State Department. He is the founder of the twice-weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter, which offers research insights and analysis on the geopolitics and geoeconomics of Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.  Prashanth has held various roles across think ... Read More